Below are links to my published papers. The links will take you to the publisher’s site, but you can also find links to these papers on my PhilPapers profile. Please contact me if you’re having trouble finding copies of any of the papers below.
“When Hypocrisy Undermines the Standing to Blame: A Reply to Rossi,” (with Daniel Miller) (2019). Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22(2): 379-384.
“The Unique Badness of Hypocritical Blame,” (with Daniel Miller) (2019). Ergo 6(19): 545-569.
“Hypocrisy, Inconsistency, and the Moral Standing of the State,” (2019). Criminal Law and Philosophy 13(2): 309-327.
“Moral Responsibility, Voluntary Control, and Intentional Action,” (2018). Philosophia 46(4): 831-855.
“Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame,” (with Daniel Miller) (2018). Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99(1): 118-139.
“Responsibility for Wrongdoing Without Blameworthiness: How it Makes Sense and How it Doesn’t,” (2014). Philosophical Quarterly 64(257): 569-589.
Here’s what I’m currently working on:
“Unjustified Asymmetry: Positive Claims of Conscience and Abortion Law”
I argue that if we allow for health care professionals to conscientiously refrain from providing abortions, moral consistency requires that we should allow for health care professionals to conscientiously provide abortions in states where fetal heartbeat bills have outlawed the practice by around six weeks.
“Why the Complicity and Hypocrisy Defense of Conscientious Objection Fails”
Some have argued that if conscientious objections are not honored, individuals may be forced to be complicit in wrongdoing. This complicity, like hypocrisy, would undermine the individual’s moral standing. I argue that this reasoning rests on a mistake regarding the nature of hypocrisy and how it undermines moral standing.
“Change of Mind, Hypocrisy, and the Challenge for Authentic Leadership”
The ability to be open with followers about one’s moral growth and change of mind is important for authentic leadership, yet recent psychological studies suggest that such openness will likely lead to followers seeing such a leader as inauthentic. This presents a significant challenge to how we should understand authentic leadership.
“The Problem of Nonvoluntary Blame” (with Daniel Miller)
It can be impermissible to blame some agent, even if they are blameworthy. This view leads to a dilemma regarding the nature of obligation, since blame can be voluntary or nonvoluntary. Ultimately, we argue that neither solution to the dilemma is without its costs.