Recently, I have been thinking a lot about the moral standing to blame. What explains the moral right or entitlement that people have to hold each other accountable? What might undermine this moral standing to blame? One of the most salient answers to that second question is hypocrisy. My recent research aims to explain why this is so. The explanation I favor might also have practical implications regarding the state’s moral standing to hold its citizens accountable and regarding the moral standing of leaders who suffer ethical failures.
I have also written on moral responsibility and voluntariness, as well as the connection between responsibility for wrongdoing and blameworthiness.
Below are links to my papers. The links will take you to the publisher’s site, but you can also find links to these papers on my PhilPapers profile. Please contact me if you’re having trouble finding copies of any of the papers below.
“When Hypocrisy Undermines the Standing to Blame: A Reply to Rossi,” (with Daniel Miller). Forthcoming in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
“The Unique Badness of Hypocritical Blame.” (with Daniel Miller). Forthcoming in Ergo.
“Hypocrisy, Inconsistency, and the Moral Standing of the State,” (2019). Criminal Law and Philosophy 13(2): 309-327.
“Moral Responsibility, Voluntary Control, and Intentional Action,” (2018). Philosophia 46(4): 831-855.
“Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame,” (with Daniel Miller) (2018). Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99(1): 118-139.
“Responsibility for Wrongdoing Without Blameworthiness: How it Makes Sense and How it Doesn’t,” (2014). Philosophical Quarterly 64(257): 569-589.